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In 1907–8, Russell and Stout presented an objection against James and Schiller, 
to which both James and Schiller replied. In this paper, I shall revisit their 
transatlantic exchange. Doing so will yield a better understanding of Schiller’s 
relationship to a worryingly solipsistic brand of phenomenalism. It will also 
allow us to appreciate a crucial difference between Schiller and James; a 
difference which James explicitly downplayed.  
As I understand Russell and Stout’s objection, it concerns James and Schiller’s 
account of content. Russell and Stout complain that, by James and Schiller’s own 
lights, the content of the claim ‘other minds exist’ concerns only my private 
experience. Since I clearly wish to go beyond my private experience, when I speak 
of other minds, James and Schiller’s pragmatism should be rejected. That is the 
nerve of the Russell–Stout objection (see §1).  
To illustrate the Russell–Stout objection, I shall introduce a particular 
philosophical character whom I call the locked-in-phenomenalist (see §2). This 
character wants to construct the entire world—other minds and all—from her 
own phenomenology. Unsurprisingly, her ambitions are thwarted. She is able 
to perform constructions which, in her terms, license her in saying ‘other minds 
exist’. However, by her own lights, the content of that claim concerns nothing 
more than her private experiences. As such, the locked-in-phenomenalist is 
clearly vulnerable to Russell–Stout.  
My locked-in-phenomenalist is something of a caricature. Sadly, her position 
is worryingly close to Schiller’s. In particular, Schiller’s discussion of how we 
‘make’ reality is extremely similar to the locked-in-phenomenalist’s description 
of our ‘construction’ of the world. Consequently, Schiller is just as vulnerable 
to Russell–Stout as the locked-in-phenomenalist (see §3).  
The story is rather different when it comes to James. Despite James’s insistence 
that he and Schiller are in agreement, I show that James is able to avoid Russell–
Stout (see §4). According to James, the content of the claim ‘other minds exist’ 
concerns entities which transcend my (possible) experience in certain key 
regards. This is all very welcome. However, it has consequences for other 
aspects of James’s pragmatism. In particular, it shows that James was wrong to 
claim in Pragmatism (1907) that his pragmatism would deliver quick solutions 
to the question of God’s existence (see §5).  
1. The Russell–Stout objection  
The focus of this paper is an objection raised by Russell and Stout against James 
and Schiller. I shall start with Russell’s formulation of the objection. He writes:  
According to the pragmatists, to say ‘it is true that other people exist’ 
means ‘it is useful to believe that other people exist.’ (1908, 400) 
Russell continues:  
But if I am troubled by solipsism, the discovery that a belief in the 
existence of others is ‘true’ in the pragmatist’s sense is not enough 
to allay my sense of loneliness: the perception that I should profit by 
rejecting solipsism is not alone sufficient to make me reject it. For 
what I desire is not that the belief in solipsism should be false in the 
pragmatic sense but that other people should in fact exist. (1908, 403) 
In raising this criticism, Russell drew explicitly from Stout, who had offered 
essentially the same criticism of Schiller:  
My sympathy with my neighbour’s headache presupposes that he is 
actually feeling it. But according to Mr. Schiller’s theory, my belief 
in other minds might be as true as truth can be, even though there 
were no emotions, feelings, desires, purposes, etc., experienced by 
any one except myself. All that, in his view, is required to constitute 
truth, is that I should postulate experiences other than mine, and 
that this postulate should enable me to control my own experiences. 
The postulate would still be true even though I were merely 
dreaming of the existence of other minds, provided that it gave me 
a guiding clue for actively determining the development of my 
dream. (1907, 585) 
I shall now outline how this objection is supposed to work, in the first instance.  
Russell and Stout suggest that James and Schiller endorse a general theory of 
truth, to the effect that ‘it is true that p’ has the same meaning as ‘it is useful to 
believe that p’. Whatever the details of ‘usefulness’ amount to, they hold that 
James and Schiller are committed to all biconditionals of this shape:	
it is useful to believe that p iff it is true that p 
However, Russell and Stout then suggest that there could be cases where it is 
useful to believe that p, even though not-p. Their example is the case when 
‘other minds exist’ passes all pragmatic tests—so that it is useful to believe that 
other minds exist—even though there are no other minds. Though Russell and 
Stout do not make the final step completely explicit, I take it that the point is as 
follows. We can surely assume that:  
if it is true that p, then p 	
Combining this with the supposed pragmatist theory of truth, James and 
Schiller should therefore always accept:  
if it is useful to believe that p, then p  
and that is just what we seem to lack, when p is other minds exist. 	
As just formulated, Russell and Stout’s criticism focusses on a particular theory 
of truth which they attribute to James and Schiller. However, the kernel of their 
argument can be restated without mentioning truth, and there are two good 
reasons for doing so. First: it not clear whether James or Schiller actually 
endorses a theory of truth of the form that Russell and Stout ascribe to them.1 
Second: avoiding mention of truth will make clear that the real focus of the 
objection does not concern truth, but content.2 	
Let me repeat the earlier quotation from Russell: 
According to the pragmatists, to say ‘it is true that other people exist’ 
means ‘it is useful to believe that other people exist.’ (1908, 400) 
                                                
1 The particular concern is whether James or Schiller endorse the conditional: if it is useful to 
believe that p, then it is true that p. James’s fullest treatment of truth provides us only with a 
series of necessary conditions on truth (1904, 474–5, points 1–7; 1909, 100–1, points 1–6). 
Likewise, Schiller affirms that ‘all truths work’, but he is not prepared to affirm ‘all that works 
is true’ (1911, 163–5; 1912b; 1913). 
2 Cf. McTaggart’s (1908, 106–7) criticism of James. 
Suppose we simply replace ‘it is true that other people exist’ with ‘other people 
exist’. Then Russell’s complaint will be that ‘other people exist’ means 
something only about my experiences, namely, ‘it is useful to believe that other 
people exist’. One might immediately complain that neither James nor Schiller 
subscribes to any such theory of meaning. I shall, of course, say much, much 
more about this below. Setting this aside for now though, Russell’s complaint 
should continue as follows. What James and Schiller claim to mean by ‘other 
people exist’ is neither what I mean, nor what I care about. For—paraphrasing 
Russell—what I desire is not that it is useful to believe that other people exist, 
but that other people should in fact exist.  
We can similarly remove mention of truth from Stout’s objection. Following 
Stout, I want to be able to sympathise with someone for their headache. But—
continuing with Stout—when James or Schiller claims ‘other minds, complete 
with headaches, exist’, the content of the claim concerns only my experiences. 
And that falls short of what I wanted.  
We can summarise the above as follows: 
The Russell–Stout Objection. By James and Schiller’s own lights, the 
content of ‘other minds exist’ only concerns my experiences, and that is 
inadequate.  
This objection is the focus of my paper. I should, though, briefly comment on 
the chosen example. We can easily imagine a Russell–Stout–esque complaint 
which focuses, not on other minds, but on chairs. It might run as follows: 
By James and Schiller’s own lights, the content of ‘the chair is made from 
wood’ only concerns my experiences, and that is inadequate. After all, 
as Dewey put the point against phenomenalism, I want to be able talk 
about ‘the chair which was bought, that is placed in a room and that is 
used to sit in, etc.’ (1929, 17). 
That would be a good objection. Nonetheless, I shall continue to focus on other 
minds. My reason for this is essentially dialectical. It is one thing to insist, hard-
headedly, that ‘the chair is made from wood’ expresses no content beyond my 
own experiences. It is quite another thing to insist that anything I say 
concerning ‘other minds’ fails to go beyond my own experiences.  
2. The locked-in-phenomenalist  
Before considering what James and Schiller (should have) said in response to 
Russell–Stout, it will help me to introduce a character who is definitely 
vulnerable to Russell–Stout. I call this character the locked-in-phenomenalist. 
Crudely, the locked-in-phenomenalist wants to construct the entire world from 
her raw phenomenology. I have two reasons for introducing her: first, because 
she presents us with a clear victim of Russell–Stout; second, because 
understanding her plight will help us to understand Schiller’s. 
In setting out the character of the locked-in-phenomenalist, I shall draw 
extensively on Carnap’s Aufbau (1928). To be clear, I am not arguing here that 
Carnap is a locked-in-phenomenalist. If you like, you can regard me just as 
offering the ‘locked-in-phenomenalist reading’ of Carnap’s Aufbau. For 
everything said in this paper, this might be a dreadful misreading of Carnap 
himself. 3  
So. According to Carnap—on this reading—‘the subjective starting point of all 
knowledge lies in experiential-contents and their interrelations’ (1928, §2). 
Carnap then uses logico- mathematical methods to manipulate these 
experiences. In so doing, he constructs ‘an intersubjective, objective world’, from 
those initial experiences basis (1928, §2). The details of Carnap’s logico-
mathematical methods need not detain us. All that matters, for our purposes, 
are the experiences with which we start.  
Carnap describes ‘the subjective starting point of all knowledge’ as the 
autopsychological basis. This comprises subjective, first-personal, mental 
experiences. Importantly, however, they are to be considered ‘as they are 
given’. Indeed, following Husserl’s phenomenological tradition, we are to 
bracket them. At the outset, we cannot ask what is causing them; nor what is 
going on ‘behind them’; nor what they designate; nor what they signify; nor 
whether they are veridical or falsidical. We cannot ask any of this, because none 
of this information is present in the experiences ‘as they are given’. It is only 
later, once we have constructed the entire external world on the basis of these 
experiences, that we can even think of the experiences as having one cause 
rather than another, or as being (in)accurate. But, at the outset, we are to restrict 
                                                
3 Although I do think that Carnap’s Aufbau exemplifies locked-in-phenomenalism. In the terms 
of the present paper, I think that the most interesting feature of the Aufbau is Carnap’s 
ingenious attempts to show how he can avoid Russell–Stout, despite being a locked-in-
phenomenalist. But I cannot pursue that topic here.  
ourselves to pure phenomenology. Carnap calls this phenomenological starting 
point the stream of experience, or the Given (1928, §64). To summarise: the aim is 
to construct the entire external world from purely phenomenological 
beginnings; from the Given.  
Since the Russell–Stout objection is my focus, my particular concern is with 
Carnap’s construction of a specific part of the external world, namely, the other 
minds. According to Carnap, physical objects are constructed at a certain stage 
in the process of constructing the world from the Given. One such physical 
object is to be ‘my body’. 4 Now, suppose that M is some physical object which 
is distinct from but physically similar to my body. On this basis, I can ascribe 
mental states to M. In particular, I can construct M’s given, by analogy with the 
Given. And then, just as I constructed the world from the Given, so I can 
construct what one might call ‘M’s world’ from ‘M’s given’ (1928, §145). But 
crucially, during the entire construction of this other mind,  
The autopsychological basis is not here abandoned; all of ‘M’s objects’ are 
still objects of the one constitution system and thus go back 
ultimately to the basic object of that system, so to a relation that 
holds between the elementary experiences (my experiences!). One 
can, however, speak in a certain sense of ‘the constitutional system of 
M’ [what we called ‘M’s world’], but nothing more is to be 
understood by this than a certain branch of ‘the’ (or ‘my’) constitution 
system [what we called ‘the world’], that branches off at a high level. 
(1928, §145) 
The crucial point is that the psychology of some other person, M, incorporates 
nothing new. Rather ‘the entire experience sequence of the other person consists in 
nothing other than a rearrangement of my own experiences and their components’ 
(1928, §140). 
This concludes the locked-in-phenomenalist reading of Carnap’s Aufbau. To 
repeat: my aim here is not to defend this as a good reading of Carnap himself; 
I am just using Carnap’s text as a means to introduce the character of the 
locked-in-phenomenalist. And this character simply endorses everything that, 
                                                
4 ‘Physical objects’ are constructed as projections from my visual field onto mathematical 
surrogates for spacetime points. ‘My body’ is then singled out by a ‘definite description’ which 
comprises claims like: ‘[m]y body is always near my eye’; ‘the visible surface [of my body] is 
an open surface, since some parts of its surface, e.g. eye and back, are invisible’; etc. (Carnap 
1928, §129). How mental states then ‘get attached’ to my body is a good question, but one I 
shall not discuss here. 
 
for better or worse, we have just read into Carnap. In particular, the locked-in-
phenomenalist cheerfully says that ‘the entire experience sequence of the other 
person consists in nothing other than a rearrangement of my own experiences and 
their components.’  
As such, the locked-in-phenomenalist is clearly vulnerable to Russell–Stout. 
Certainly the locked-in-phenomenalist will be happy to assert ‘other minds 
exist’. After all, her experiences lead her to perform certain constructions, on 
the basis of which she says ‘there are many other people, together with their 
minds’. But, as she has admitted herself, any claim which she makes about ‘the 
external world’—including the claim ‘other minds exist’—goes ‘back 
ultimately to…the elementary experiences (my experiences!)’. Thus she 
contends that the content of ‘other minds exist’ only concerns her experiences. 
And that is surely inadequate, as Russell–Stout contends.  
In this section, I have introduced the locked-in-phenomenalist, and shown why 
she is clearly vulnerable to Russell–Stout. Her difficulties help us to understand 
the nature of Russell–Stout, and we should keep in mind her fate as we begin 
to consider how Russell–Stout applies to James and Schiller. At the risk of 
ruining the surprise: in §3, I shall show that Schiller is much too close to being 
a locked-in-phenomenalist, and so succumbs to Russell–Stout. Then in §4, I 
shall show that James’s pragmatism is importantly different from Schiller’s, 
and so avoids Russell–Stout.  
3. Schiller’s proximity to locked-in-
phenomenalism  
To begin my discussion of Schiller, I shall highlight several ways in which 
Schiller is extremely close to locked-in-phenomenalism.  
‘Making’ reality 
Schiller tells us that ‘the whole world in which we live is experience and built 
up out of nothing else than experience’ (1902, 51). Moreover, he ultimately 
answers the question, ‘whose experience is it?’, by saying, ‘my experience’ 
(1902, 52).5 As for the locked-in-phenomenalist, then, Schiller’s aim is to ‘make’ 
the world from a purely first-person starting point.  
Schiller calls this starting point ‘primary reality’, and he explains it as follows:  
In the wider sense everything is ‘fact,’ qua experienced, including 
imaginings, illusions, errors, hallucinations. ‘Fact’ in this strict sense 
is anterior to the distinction of ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ and covers 
both. To distinguish it we may call it ‘primary reality.’ Its existence 
is undeniable, and in a sense most important. For it is the starting-
point, and final touchstone, of all our theories about reality, which 
have for their aim its transformation. It may, certainly, in a sense, be 
called ‘independent’ of us, if that comforts any one. For it is certainly 
not ‘made’ by us, but ‘found.’ But, as it stands, we find it most 
unsatisfactory and set to work to remake it and unmake it. And it 
cannot possibly be taken as ‘real fact’ or ‘true reality.’ For, as 
immediately experienced, it is a meaningless chaos, merely the raw 
material of a cosmos, the stuff out of which real fact is made. (1907a, 
187)  
Schiller’s primary reality is, then, strikingly close to the phenomenological 
starting point of our locked-in-phenomenalist. One point of agreement is 
particularly worth highlighting. At the ‘outset’—i.e. when the locked-in-
phenomenalist considers the Given, or when Schiller considers primary reality—
the experiences are bracketed. In particular: at the ‘outset’, it makes no sense to 
ask whether experiences are veridical or falsidical, merely apparent or real. I 
can only ask these questions once I have introduced these distinctions. And I 
can only introduce these distinctions by first making a world. But I make that 
world, and introduce these distinctions, on and only on the basis of what is 
most expedient given the bracketed starting point. This is why Schiller could 
say, in a letter to James of 19 January 1907, that ‘the distinction between “true” 
                                                
5 In fairness to Schiller, he hesitates slightly. His full answer is ‘“our experience,” or, if that 
imply too much agreement among philosophers, and I may not take a common world for 
granted, more precisely, “my experience.”’ My point here is that Schiller is happy enough to 
slip from methodological ‘populipsism’ to methodological solipsism. I conjecture that Schiller 
is happy to do this, since he thinks that, even as a methodological solipsist, he will succeed in 
establishing a world populated with other minds (cf. my diagnosis of James in §4). 
Unfortunately, as we shall see, he is wrong about this. Note that all of this helps to contextualise 
Schiller’s remark to James, in a letter of 19 December 1909, that ‘You seem to think that my 
procedure commits me to a methodological solipsism’ (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 391).  
& “false” perception (hallucination &c) is itself a pragmatic one’ (Skrupskelis 
and Berkeley 2003, 304).  
With all this in mind, let us turn to Schiller’s comments on how ‘secondary 
reality’—the ‘external world’—is made. Here is Schiller:  
the objects of true perception…are, in fact, creatures of our thought, 
constructed out of the crude material of our passing experiences 
(Erlebnisse), in order to regulate our lives and to guide our 
expectations. They are, in short, essentially pragmatic in their nature 
and function, and though they may be said to ‘transcend’ the fleeting 
experiences to which they serve as an ideal support, this 
transcendence is merely the expression of our postulate that there 
shall be such relatively stable pegs on which to hang the streaming 
strands of the phenomena that eddy around us. (1909c, 96) 
Schiller’s use of the word ‘postulate’ is slightly idiosyncratic, and I shall revisit 
this below. But, bracketing this for now, the entire quotation could have come 
straight from the mouth of our locked-in-phenomenalist.  
The similarities between Schiller and the locked-in-phenomenalist are quite 
clear. However, I should comment on two differences.  
First, Schiller’s notion of ‘making’ reality is genuinely temporal. The locked-in-
phenomenalist’s ‘constructions’ are atemporal: to speak of ‘construction’, as if 
it were a process, is to adopt a convenient methodological fiction for describing 
some abstract logic/mathematics. By contrast, according to Schiller, my 
‘making’ of the world takes place in time, and I constantly ‘remake’ it. This is 
why Schiller writes to James on 25 October 1907, explaining that primary reality 
is not really ‘a psychical starting point in adult life’; for in adult life our reality 
‘is always more or less “made”’ (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 469).  
Second, as Yolton (1950) emphasizes, Schiller’s notion of ‘making’ reality 
involves some voluntary and personal contribution from the subject who does 
the ‘making’. Consequently, Yolton claims that Schiller ‘did not wish to 
advocate the kind of idealism which asserts that we posit the “other” out of our 
own self’ (1950, 52). Instead, Schiller ends up advocating ‘some sort of 
subjective idealism in which the external world is not conceived wholly in 
terms of sense data but in which the “something other than sense data” is made 
to depend, for its specific nature, upon the human’ contribution (1950, 53).6  
We can summarize these two differences briefly. According to Schiller, I can 
unmake and remake what I have made, and my making involves my distinctive 
contribution. But these differences do not much matter when it comes to 
Russell–Stout. Crucially, if crudely: you have no say over how I make you. This, 
indeed, is why Schiller is prepared to say things like this: 
Every sort of distinct perceptual object…, alike whether it be a 
‘thing’ or a ‘person,’ seems to be manifestly man-made, i.e., relative 
to the human interests which singled it out, and preserve for it its 
status as a ‘reality’ which it is expedient to take into account.  (1910a, 
226)7  
Just as for the locked-in-phenomenalist, so for Schiller: talk of another ‘person’ 
ultimately goes back to me. This is why Schiller is vulnerable to Russell–Stout. 
For his part, Schiller made two points in reply to Russell–Stout. Unfortunately, 
as I shall show in the remainder of this section, both are entirely ineffectual. 
Schiller treats Stout as simply having accused him of being a solipsist, 8 and 
replies by insisting that he is not (1909b, 170). As such, Schiller fails to engage 
with the nerve of Russell–Stout, which concerns Schiller’s views on the content 
of the claim ‘other minds exist’. 
                                                
6 Yolton suggests that Schiller is led towards this ‘subjective idealism’ due to ‘a very 
fundamental confusion’, namely, ‘the failure to distinguish between ontological and 
epistemological reality at every level of his discussion’ (1950, 56). He then suggests that we 
should remove these confusions, on Schiller’s behalf, and insist that ‘the making of reality for 
Schiller is epistemological and not ontological’ (1950, 57).  
This reading provides Schiller with a clear response to Russell–Stout. However, it comes at the 
cost of declawing Schiller. Yolton’s declawed Schiller is not the man who claimed that 
‘pragmatism as an epistemological method’ falls short of his Humanism (1905, 239); who raged 
against the very idea of ‘transcendent correspondences’ (1907b, 600); who denied ‘that in ultimate 
analysis there can persist a discrepancy between the true and the useful' (1912a, 103); or who 
wrote any of the passages quoted in this section. 
7 cf. also Schiller’s letter to James of 10 July 1905 (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 72). 
8 Schiller responds to Stout’s formulation rather than Russell’s. (Schiller’s 1908 reply to Russell’s 
1908 does not touch upon Russell–Stout.)  James and Schiller both thought highly of Stout’s 
(1907) critical notice of Schiller 1907a, but were fairly unimpressed by Stout’s version of 
Russell–Stout; see the letter from James to Schiller of 16 October 1907, and Schiller’s reply on 
25 October 1907 (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 461–2 and 468–9).  
Schiller’s ‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism 
In letters to James of 10 July 1905 and 10 January 1908 (Skrupskelis and 
Berkeley 2003, 72, 516), Schiller complains that it is unfair to single out 
humanism (or pragmatism) as particularly unable to refute the charge of 
solipsism. He develops these points further in print, arguing that his humanism 
is uniquely well placed to demonstrate its opposition to solipsism. In 
particular, whilst humanists can freely explore the hypothesis of solipsism, 
they are almost certain to reject it in the end, since solipsism is unlikely to sit 
well with their experiences (1907a, 471–3; 1909a, 128; 1909b, 170).  This supplies 
a ‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism. Schiller then adds that anyone who rejects 
solipsism will ultimately have to employ the same ‘pragmatic rebuttal’ 
themselves. The only difference is that Schiller will be honest and upfront about 
its nature. 
This, then, is Schiller’s first response to Russell–Stout. Unfortunately, it fails to 
make contact with the objection. Russell and Stout have not claimed that 
Schiller is unwilling to say ‘other minds exist’. The nerve of their objection is 
simply that, if Schiller were right about ‘making’ reality, then ‘other minds 
exist’ would not mean that other minds exist. Nothing in Schiller’s ‘pragmatic 
rebuttal’ of solipsism has even spoken to this point.  
To highlight this, note that a locked-in-phenomenalist can offer exactly the 
same ‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism. The locked-in-phenomenalist, like the 
humanist, can freely explore the hypothesis of solipsism. However, the locked-
in-phenomenalist will ultimately reject it, since (what she calls) ‘solipsism’ will 
not sit well with her experiences. After all, her experiences will lead her to 
constructions which license her in saying ‘other minds exist’. None of this, 
though, does anything to dispel the point that, by the locked-in-
phenomenalist’s own lights, the content of ‘other minds exist’ concerns only her 
experience.  
A distinction between two kinds of postulates 
Schiller’s second response to Stout concerns his idiosyncratic use of the term 
‘postulate’, as raised earlier. From 1902 onwards, Schiller talks in terms of 
postulates which may or may not be confirmed by experience. The postulate 
relevant to the Russell–Stout objection is ‘other minds exist’, and Stout phrases 
his version of Russell–Stout in terms of that postulate (see the quote in §1). 
Schiller replies that Stout has failed to see that there are two different ways to 
lay down a postulate:  
(1) It may be held that certain experiences behave as if there were 
other minds behind them. If so, this postulate need not lead to a 
belief in the existence of other minds. But if (2) other minds are 
postulated as existing, then the confirmation of this postulate by its 
working seems necessarily to prove that other minds really and 
truly exist. A mere appeal to postulation thus leaves either of these 
ways open; but only the first could be correctly described as 
compatible with Solipsism (1909b, 170n.1) 
Schiller insists that he embraces method-(2), and as such is not a solipsist. Now, 
this reply is less obviously orthogonal to Russell–Stout than Schiller’s 
‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism, since postulating as existing rather than as if 
might lead to some difference in content. However, neither method of 
postulation really helps Schiller to deal with Russell–Stout.  
To show this, I shall start by considering method-(1). The chief difficulty here 
is in understanding what Schiller means by the expression ‘as if’. When we 
think this through, we shall see that method-(1) is not compatible with 
solipsism, even according to Schiller.  
Suppose that someone is looking at a straight stick which is partly immersed 
in water. To them, it is as if the stick is bent, even though the stick it is not 
actually bent. However, it is only as if the stick is bent, for so long as they 
merely look at the stick. If they move the stick out of the water, or if they touch 
the stick with their hands, then it will no longer be as if the stick is bent. This is 
the sort of thing which allows Schiller to make a distinction between its being 
as if the stick is bent, and the stick’s actually being bent. 
Suppose, however, that someone accepts that it is as if p, for absolutely all 
intents and purposes, but refrains from thinking that it is actually the case that 
p, and merely treats it as a useful ‘fiction’ to claim that p. Then, Schiller says, 
they have made a philosophical mistake: they are in the grip of the dastardly 
‘“copy” theory of truth’. After all, ‘[b]ut for their continuing to think it the 
business of truth to copy (or represent or reflect) reality…, there would be no 
reason to dub our practical procedures “fiction”’ (1912a, 99).9 So, if it is as if p 
for absolutely all intents and purposes, then—according to Schiller—it is the 
case that p.  
                                                
9 See also Schiller (1911, 164–5n.) and Schiller’s suggestion to James, in a letter of 25 October 
1907, that Stout’s formulation of Russell–Stout ‘arises out of a momentary relapse into the 
intellectualist theory of truth’ (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 469). 
With this appreciated, let us return to solipsism. The solipsist might well say 
that it is as if other minds exist. But, in saying this, she is not suggesting that 
the apparent minds are like the apparently bent stick. If we move the stick out 
of the water, or we touch it, we can confirm that it is really straight. But the 
solipsist is quite explicitly not suggesting that some test will reveal that there 
are no other minds after all. The hypothesis is not that a more thorough 
inspection will lead us to realise that some apparently-mind-possessing thing 
is merely a crude automaton. On the contrary, the solipsist agrees that it is as if 
there are other minds, for absolutely all intents and purposes. But then, given 
what we saw above, Schiller must regard the solipsist as a victim of the ‘“copy” 
theory of truth’.  
Consequently, by Schiller’s own lights, method-(1) of postulating ‘other minds’ 
is incompatible with solipsism. We must instead focus on method-(2). This is, 
in any case, how Schiller claims to postulate ‘other minds’.  
Concerning method-(2), Schiller claims that ‘the confirmation of this postulate 
by its working seems necessarily to prove that other minds really and truly 
exist’. But this is just much too blasé, not least because anyone who worries 
about solipsism will question the necessity of the connection between 
confirmation and existence. Moreover, and more specifically, Schiller is only 
prepared to accept the necessity of that confirmation, because he takes it that 
the content of the claim ‘other minds exist’ only concerns what works (i.e. 
something about my experiences). This is reinforced by the observation we just 
made, that Schiller can see no gap between its being as if there are other minds 
for absolutely all intents and purposes, and there actually being other minds. 
But, so the worry goes, anyone who can see no gap here must be a victim of 
Russell–Stout. For the whole point of saying ‘other minds exist’ is to go beyond 
what works for me, i.e. beyond my experiences.  
To bring all of this home, note that the locked-in-phenomenalist can say exactly 
the same things as Schiller about postulates. Like Schiller, the locked-in-
phenomenalist can distinguish between its being as if a stick is bent, and its 
actually being bent. After all, certain experiences lead her to speak of ‘the stick’; 
certain experiences may lead her to say ‘the stick looks bent’; but her best 
overall account of ‘the external world’ ultimately leads her to say that ‘the stick 
is straight but looks bent under certain circumstances’. What the locked-in-
phenomenalist cannot do, though, is make sense of a general attitude of 
fictionalism, for that would certainly require that her (entirely successful) 
constructions be answerable to a world beyond her subjective experiences. 
Finally—and for just this reason—she too insists that the postulate ‘other minds 
exist’ is necessarily confirmed by the experiences she in fact has, since, by her 
own lights, the content of that postulate just concerns her experiences. None of 
this, though, rebuts Russell–Stout; it merely repeats that the locked-in-
phenomenalist is a victim of Russell–Stout.  
The upshot is clear. Schiller’s notion of ‘making’ reality is much too close to 
locked-in-phenomenalism, and nothing Schiller says in reply to Russell–Stout 
establishes any important distance. Indeed, his replies display an inability to 
understand what the Russell–Stout objection really was. Schiller, in short, 
succumbs to Russell–Stout.  
4. James as a naïve realist 
I shall now turn my attention to James. I shall begin by outlining his expressions 
of naïve realism. These afford James an excellent reply to Russell–Stout. 
Unfortunately, James somewhat obscures this reply, by explicitly claiming to 
share Schiller’s problematic views. However, I shall argue that this was a 
mistake on his part, and that the (sincerely) naïve realist James avoids Russell–
Stout.  
James’s expressions of naïve realism 
In several places in The Meaning of Truth (1909), James embraces naïve realism. 
For example, he explains that his account of truth is fully object-involving. He 
writes: ‘Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one 
hand, and a reality outside of the idea, on the other’ (1909, 163). Moreover, ‘the 
existence of the object, whenever the idea asserts it “truly,” is the only reason, 
in innumerable cases, why the idea does work successfully, if it work at all’ 
(1909, xv–xvi). He adds that, when he had advanced his views on truth in 
earlier publications, ‘My mind was so filled with the notion of objective 
reference that I never dreamed that my hearers would let go of it’ (1909, 233). 
James says similar things concerning reality and its objects. For example: ‘This 
notion of a reality independent of us, taken from ordinary social experience, 
lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth’ (1909, 217–8). And ‘as a 
pragmatist I have so carefully posited “reality” ab initio, and…, throughout my 
whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist’ (1909, 195). That is, James 
postulates ‘a standing reality independent of the idea that knows it’ (1909, 158). 
Elsewhere, James explicitly assumes ‘the point of view of naïf realism or 
common sense’ (1909, 50n.).10  
Schiller’s criticisms of James 
Predictably, Schiller is a bit bemused by all of this. His bemusement comes 
through rather beautifully in his reaction to James’s discussion of Julius Cæsar 
(1909, 221–5, published a year earlier). James is considering the question of how 
we can think about Cæsar, even though he is long since ‘dead and turned to 
clay’. In the course of his discussion, James says that the truth of our utterance 
‘Cæsar exists’ depends upon the existence of Cæsar (223–4). This should be 
utterly banal, but Schiller writes to James on 10 April 1908 with concern: 
I cannot see how the objective fact of e.g. Cæsar’s death can ever 
transcend the evidence on the strength of which we preferred to 
believe in the historical tradition. Anything that affects the tradition 
affects pro tanto the objective reality of Cæsar. (Skrupskelis and 
Berkeley 2004, 6)11 
Astonishingly, Schiller here shows that he is incapable even of registering that 
Cæsar’s life and Cæsar’s experience might transcend our present evidence. 
Schiller’s bemusement makes its way  into print.12 In his critical notice of The 
Meaning of Truth (James 1909), Schiller writes that James lays ‘what seems 
disproportionate stress on the question whether a pragmatist can believe in 
“real objects”’ (1910b: 260). Schiller regards the question as hopelessly 
confused, and laments that James ‘even seems to countenance the confused 
rationalistic putting of the question’ (1910b, 262). For Schiller, the only 
                                                
10 More fully, James (1909, 50n.) claims that ch.II of his 1909 is written ‘from the point of view 
of naïf realism or common sense, and avoids raising the idealistic controversy’. As James notes 
(1909, 43n.1), this chapter is an extract from an earlier paper. Interestingly, in that earlier paper, 
James explicitly declared himself on the idealistic side (1895, 106). 
11 In his defence, Schiller notes that ‘these are only first impressions’ of James’s essay on Cæsar. 
However, this is just one example of Schiller’s private complaints about James’s naïve realism. 
On 29 July 1904, Schiller had simply suggested ‘you take things more realistically than I am 
wont to do, though I dare say the difference is more a matter of wording’ (Skrupskelis and 
Berkeley 2002, 441). By October 1907, Schiller was outlining to James the ‘plain humanist 
answer’ which would feature in his critical notice of James 1909 (see below). And by 10 January 
1908, Schiller was complaining ‘I don’t quite see why you shd be so anxious to vindicate for us 
the right to use a realistic terminology’, following up the point on 1 March 1908 (Skrupskelis 
and Berkeley 2003, 468, 516, 547 respectively). 
12 Though, interestingly, he now describes the chapter on Julius Cæsar as ‘particularly lucid 
and effective in clearing up misconceptions’ (1910b, 259). 
worthwhile question, concerning the existence of an object, is ‘simply one of 
the testing of a claim to reality’ (1910b: 261). He is similarly critical of James’s 
admission that truth involves ‘a relation to a real object postulated to be there’, 
asking ‘what is the use of postulating a real object, apart from any means of 
testing whether it really is there?’ (1910b, 262). Schiller, as usual, cannot even 
register that objects might transcend tests of which I am the sole arbiter. 
Schiller’s rejection of naïve realism is exactly what we should predict of a victim 
of Russell–Stout. Conversely, James’s willingness to embrace naïve realism 
allows him to give a simple reply Russell–Stout: As a naïve realist, I hold that the 
content of ‘other minds exist’ is no more nor less than that other minds exist, where 
other minds are objects independent from me and from my experiences.  
James’s proximity to Schiller  
Ultimately, this is precisely what James should say against Russell–Stout. 
Unfortunately, though, the point is a little exegetically complicated, for James 
explicitly claims that he and Schiller are in agreement. 
Both in private and in print, James insists that ‘Schiller’s doctrine and mine are 
identical, only our expositions follow different directions’ (1909, 242). The 
difference is that James helps himself, at the outset, to terms which he believes 
Schiller will ultimately vindicate (1909, 244). According to James, Schiller is 
starting with the (auto)psychological and then successfully ‘making’ the entire 
world; James, instead, is anticipating the success of Schiller’s project, and so is 
happy simply to start with this ‘ready-made’ world. Or, as he put the point in 
a letter to Schiller of 16 June 1908: 
You start with the psychological subject claiming a statement of his 
to be ‘true’, & verifying it by working towards conclusions which 
lead him to say ‘these are the something, or the proximate marks of 
agreement with the something, which my statement meant.’ I start 
with the something (calling it ‘reality’) & ask what makes the 
statement ‘true’ of it, replying by instancing your verifying 
workings, as constituting the agreement in concreto. (Skrupskelis 
and Berkeley 2004, 30)13 
                                                
13 See also James (1909, xviii–xix), his letters to Schiller of 20 March 1908, 16 June 1908, 5 January 
1910 and 4 May 1910 (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 552; 2004, 409 and 493) and Schiller 
(1910b, 260). 
James goes on to explain to Schiller the dialectical advantage of his way of 
approaching things: 
because I start by postulating the reality which you only end by 
verifying, [our critics] are willing to say that I talk sense (at least some 
of them are!) but that you mean something different. (Skrupskelis 
and Berkeley 2004, 30) 
In fact, James mentions this dialectical advantage repeatedly.14 Before penning 
his (critical) critical notice of The Meaning of Truth, Schiller briefly outlined its 
proposed contents to James, in a postcard of 26 October 1909, and asked ‘Do 
you give your assent to this treatment?’ (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2004, 355). 
James replied on 6 November: 
Of course I entirely assent to the treatment you propose. Your form 
of attacking the problem is doubtless logically more shipshape than 
mine, but I think that mine works perhaps more easily on the 
philosophic rabble. (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2004, 361) 
All of this, however, leads to a worrying thought: James’s apparent commitment 
to naïve realism is a mere dialectical expedient. It is not, on this line of thought, that 
James has adopted an importantly different philosophical stance from Schiller; 
it is just that he wants to avoid getting bogged down in the objections that have 
been raised against Schiller. However, so this thought runs, James believes that 
Schiller can ultimately answer those objections, and so ‘make’ the ‘independent 
objects’ that James wants to invoke. But this threatens to cast James’s apparent 
naïve realism in a very different light. For if James’s ‘independent objects’ are 
in fact to be ‘made’, Schiller-style, then James will fall right back into Russell–
Stout.  
We face a choice. We must either read James as a victim of Russell–Stout 
alongside Schiller, or prise James’s naïve realism apart from Schiller’s 
humanism.  
I recommend the latter. Separating James from Schiller requires only that we 
attribute to James a mistaken (but sincere and charitable) belief concerning the 
prospects of his friend’s philosophical project.15 And attributing this mistake to 
                                                
14 Indeed, in all the letters mentioned in the previous footnote. 
15 We might also speculate as to whether James misunderstands Schiller’s project slightly. The 
discussion of ‘verifying’, in the letter of 16 June 1908, hints that James might take Schiller to be 
making only an epistemological point, and not a metaphysical one (cf. footnote 6). In this regard, 
it is worth commenting that James writes to Schiller on 19 April 1907, saying ‘The Essays on 
James allows him to avoid the (otherwise devastating) Russell–Stout objection. 
Moreover, as I shall now argue, a sincere commitment to naïve realism makes 
the best sense of James’s most detailed discussions of other minds, in the final 
years of his life.16 
James’s reply to Russell 
Where Schiller replied to Stout’s formulation of Russell–Stout, James replied to 
Russell’s. Here is the most direct part of his reply:  
When I call a belief true, and define its truth to mean its workings, I 
certainly do not mean that the belief is a belief about the workings. It 
is a belief about the object, and I who talk about the workings am a 
different subject, with a different universe of discourse, from that of 
the believer of whose concrete thinking I profess to give an account.  
The social proposition ‘other men exist’ and the pragmatist 
proposition ‘it is expedient to believe that other men exist’ come 
from different universes of discourse…. The first expresses the 
object of a belief, the second tells of one condition of the belief ’s 
power to maintain itself. (1909, 279–80) 
In this passage, James is very much alive to the Russell–Stout objection (and 
certainly much more alive to it than Schiller). After all, James is explicitly 
concerned with the content of the claim ‘other minds exist’. Indeed, James 
himself drops the mention of truth from Russell’s objection (as advocated in §1).  
That said, the reply is not entirely successful. If I say ‘it is useful to believe that 
other minds exist’, one can reasonably ask ‘useful for whom?’ If I clarify my 
position by saying ‘it is useful for Sigi to believe that other minds exist’, then I 
have clearly said something different than if I had simply said ‘other minds 
exist’. After all, to paraphrase James: I, who talk about the workings of Sigi’s belief, 
am a different subject than Sigi, with a different universe of discourse from that of Sigi. 
                                                
Freedom & the making of Reality [in Schiller 1907a] seem to be written with my own heart’s 
blood—it’s startling that two people should be found to think so exactly alike’ (Skrupskelis and 
Berkeley 2003, 345). This might make it seem as if James unequivocally endorses Schiller’s 
notion of ‘making’ reality. However, I would caution against that reading. The two essays 
which James mentions contain surprisingly little to indicate Schiller’s proximity to locked-in-
phenomenalism: read in isolation, they admit a more epistemological reading. Moreover, in the 
same letter James tells us that he has still ‘only read about a quarter of [Schiller’s book] even 
now’. 
16 Note that the reading should only be applied to the last few years of James’s life (see footnote 
10, above). 
But suppose, instead, that I answer the question ‘useful for whom?’ by replying 
‘it is useful for me to believe that other minds exist’. Then it is no longer 
immediately clear that this has a different content than my claim ‘other minds 
exist’. At the very least, I cannot try to show that it does by deploying the same 
line of reasoning as I did regarding Sigi, for it would be completely absurd to 
argue: I, who talk about the workings of my beliefs, am a different subject than me, 
with a different universe of discourse from me. 
As such, James’s invocation of ‘different universes of discourse’ does not 
immediately yield a convincing response to Russell–Stout. Nonetheless, in 
discussing the question of content, James clearly shows that he wanted to 
address Russell–Stout directly. And fortunately, although James does not 
present them in this way, other passages in The Meaning of Truth show us 
precisely what James should have said in reply to Russell–Stout.  
James on headaches 
At several points in The Meaning of Truth, James aims to explain someone can 
think about some object. He presents three memorable examples: thinking 
about the tigers in India; thinking about Memorial Hall; and finally, as 
mentioned above, thinking about Julius Cæsar (1909, respectively 43–50, 104–
115, 221–5). In each of these cases, James’s primary task is to explain that 
thinking about is an ambulatory relation, rather than a saltatory one. What he 
means by this is the following. When someone thinks about an object, their 
thought does not have to leap over some ‘epistemological chasm’ (i.e. thinking 
about is not saltatory) between the thinker and the thought-of object. Rather, 
there is a continuous chain of actual or potential experiences connecting the 
thinker with the thought-of object (i.e. thinking about is ambulatory). Finally, 
James insists that this chain can be explicated entirely in pragmatic terms.  
James’s contrast between ambulatory and saltatory relations tacitly makes 
contact with Russell–Stout, when James explicitly discusses an objection due to 
Pratt. Like Stout, Pratt is considering the case of thinking about someone else’s 
headache, and writes:  
If there be a succession of intermediaries between my thought and 
your headache—or between my thought and Nebuchadnezzar’s 
headache—neither you nor I nor Nebuchadnezzar ever experiences 
the succession. My experience breaks off where yours begin. (Pratt 1909, 
157–8) 
The point of Pratt’s criticism is this: precisely because someone else’s headache 
is their headache rather than my own, there must be some ‘saltatory’ element 
when I think about it. And, in reply to Pratt, James concedes exactly this:  
I am still at one remove, and the headache ‘transcends’ me, even tho 
it be in nowise transcendent of human experience generally. But the 
‘gulf’ here is that which the pragmatist epistemology itself fixes in 
the very first words it uses, by saying there must be an object and an 
idea. The idea however does n’t immediately leap the gulf, it only 
works from next to next so as to bridge it, fully or approximately. 
(1909, 178–9) 
This ‘leap’ over a ‘gulf’ is precisely what the locked-in-phenomenalist, and 
Schiller, quite simply cannot make sense of. So it is here that James finally and 
crisply separates himself from their company. And, just to reinforce the point, 
James closes the discussion as follows:  
But to ask the pragmatist thereupon whether, when it thus fails to 
coalesce bodily with the object, [the idea of the other person’s 
headache] is really true or has real trueness,—in other words whether 
the headache he supposes, and supposes the thinker he supposes, to 
believe in, be a real headache or not,—is to step from his 
hypothetical universe of discourse into the altogether different 
world of natural fact. (1909, 179) 
In this passage, James acknowledges that the question of whether there really 
is another mind—complete with a headache that is not James’s—transcends ‘his 
hypothetical universe of discourse’; that is, it transcends his ‘vision of his 
hypothetical universe’ (as James explains a few lines earlier). But James does 
not take this transcendence as a reason to dismiss the question, as the locked-in-
phenomenalist or Schiller would have done. Rather, James labels it as a 
question of natural fact. So: James thinks that there can be natural facts, 
including headaches of other people, which involve stepping outside any one 
person’s (even possible) ‘hypothetical universe’. Otherwise put: James regards 
the question of whether ‘other minds exist’ as ultimately a matter of natural 
fact, and not a mere matter of my experiences. That is just to confirm James’s 
status as a naïve realist about other minds, and so to say that James, ultimately, 
avoids Russell–Stout. 
5. James on God’s existence  
I have argued that James and Schiller should be read as parting company in 
response to Russell–Stout. I want to close this paper, though, by considering 
how this parting of ways affects James’s reflections on theism. 
God’s existence in James’s Pragmatism 
In his Pragmatism (1907), James attempts to illustrate the efficacy and benefits 
of the pragmatic method by applying it to the question of God’s existence. His 
discussion climaxes in the announcement:  
‘God’s in his heaven; all’s right with the world!’—That’s the real 
heart of your theology, and for that you need no rationalistic 
definitions. (1907, 121–2)  
This is clearly a claim about the content of ‘God exists’. Moreover, James later 
summarises that discussion as follows:  
Reducing, by the pragmatic test, the meaning of each of these 
concepts [‘God,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘design’] to its positive 
experienceable operation, I showed them all to mean the same thing, 
viz., the presence of ‘promise’ in the world. ‘God or no God?’ means 
‘promise or no promise?’ (1909, x) 
Again, this is a claim about the content of ‘God exists’.  
Russell–Stout, as applied to ‘God exists’ 
The obvious complaint—which was raised by many of James’s 
contemporaries—is that James’s treatment of the phrase ‘God exists’ prevents 
it from meaning that God exists. And one way to put flesh on this objection is 
as follows.  
Many theologies regard God as a person. Even if She is not the kind of person 
who has headaches, She is presumably the kind of person who has thoughts 
and feelings (thoughts concerning mercy; feelings of unconditional love; that 
sort of thing). Just as we consider another’s headaches in sympathy, we may 
want to consider these thoughts and feelings in worship. But if James were 
right that the content of ‘God exists’ is merely that the cosmos holds promise, 
then when we think ‘God exists’, we fail to reach all the way out to God Herself 
and to Her thoughts (assuming She exists). The content of the claim 
inadequately terminates in the warm fuzzy glow it gives us.  
This, of course, is a reapplication of Russell–Stout, to the case of ‘God exists’ 
rather than ‘other minds exist’. And the comparison between the two cases 
becomes particularly interesting, when we consider exactly how James applied 
‘the pragmatic test’ in Pragmatism.  
A high-point of that discussion is James’s attempt to demonstrate that ‘Matter 
and God’ in fact ‘mean exactly the same thing’, since ‘[t]he actually experienced 
world is supposed to be the same in its details on either’ the hypothesis of 
theism or the hypothesis of materialism (1907, 99 and 98). So: suppose that we 
apply this very same ‘pragmatic test’, not to the case of materialism versus 
theism, but to hypotheses concerning other persons. On the one hand, we have 
the pluralistic hypothesis that there are other people with headaches and 
toothaches and so forth; and on the other hand, we have the solipsistic 
hypothesis that only I ever really experience anything. The worry is that, just as 
in the case of theism versus materialism, ‘[t]he actually experienced world is 
supposed to be the same in its details on either hypothesis.’ So, if we apply ‘the 
pragmatic test’ to the case of pluralism versus solipsism, in the same way as we 
applied that test to theism versus materialism, we will reach the conclusion that 
pluralism and solipsism ‘mean exactly the same thing’. And that would turn 
James back into a victim of Russell–Stout.  
Briefly stated, then, James seems to have one standard when it comes to ‘human 
minds’ and a different standard for ‘divine minds’. Only such a double-
standard could allow him to escape from Russell–Stout, as directed against 
other (human) minds, whilst drawing the semantic-cum-metaphysical 
conclusion that theism and materialism are the same.  
Imagined reply: embracing a double-standard 
James’s writings provide some scope for the development of this double-
standard. Immediately after meeting with Russell on 24 May 1908, James writes 
to him, explaining: 
In a nutshell my opinion is this: that instead of there being one 
universal relation sui generis called ‘truth’ between any reality and 
an idea, there are a host of particular relations varying according to 
special circumstances and constituted by the manner of ‘working’ or 
‘leading’ of the idea through the surrounding experiences of which 
both the reality and the idea are part. (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 
2004, 18) 
As Skrupskelis and Berkeley (2004, xl) note, ‘this formula leaves open at least 
the possibility that the truth relation in which the object is authoritative…is one 
kind of truth’. It similarly leaves open the possibility of a double-standard 
concerning content. One might maintain that discourse ‘about other people’ 
works in a different way than discourse ‘about God’, for they serve different 
purposes. The purpose of the former incorporates our desire to sympathise 
with another’s headaches, whereas the purpose of the latter (perhaps) is to 
allow us to affirm (in certain special ways) that ‘all’s right with the world’, or 
that the world has ‘promise’. If so, then the content of discourse concerning 
‘other people’ will make other people authoritative over their own existence 
(and headaches), whereas the content of discourse concerning ‘God’ grants 
‘Her’ no similar authority.  
However, as a purely descriptive matter, it is not very plausible to take the 
question ‘God or no God?’ as simply ‘promise or no promise?’ Those who 
seriously ask the question often take themselves to be considering the existence 
of a divine person. Now, one potential theological barrier to describing God as 
a ‘person’ is that it abases God, bringing Her too close to ‘mere humans’. But to 
reduce the claim ‘God is a person’ to a claim, not about persons at all but about 
the world’s promise, seems to constitute an entirely different order of sacrilege.  
Treating God as a person 
In fact, James does not pursue a double-standard concerning social and theistic 
discourse. In a letter of 16 October 1907 (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 462), 
James confided to Schiller about his ‘bad conscience’ concerning the claim that 
theism and materialism ‘mean exactly the same thing’. Moreover, as I shall 
explain, his reasons for regret are deeply connected with the issue of God’s 
personhood. 
James asks us to consider:  
an ‘automatic sweetheart,’ meaning a soulless body which should 
be absolutely indistinguishable from a spiritually animated 
maiden…. Would any one regard her as a full equivalent? Certainly 
not, and why? Because, framed as we are, our egoism craves above 
all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and admiration. 
The outward treatment is valued mainly as an expression, as a 
manifestation of the accompanying consciousness believed in. 
Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic sweetheart would not 
work, and in point of fact no one treats it as a serious hypothesis. 
(1909, 189n.)  
As I read this passage, James is not just making the narrow point that no one 
would believe ‘my sweetheart is automatic’ rather than ‘my sweetheart has a 
mind’. (That narrow point would just amount to Schiller’s attempted 
‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism, which fails to dispel Russell–Stout.) This 
passage should rather be read in connection with the idea that another’s 
headache is a natural fact. It is only because I recognise that my sweetheart has 
a mind, that ‘the outward treatment’ has the value it does. James continues this 
point, in his letter of 16 October 1907, by pointing out: 
We wish to be sure of her interest in us, and that her responsive 
caresses are meant and felt. (Skrupskelis and Berkeley 2003, 462) 
This passage has a significance for James which it cannot have for Schiller. For 
all of the italicised elements—and they are James’s own italics—involve us in 
natural fact, separated from my experience by a ‘gulf’ that my thought must 
ultimately leap. This is yet another way to see that James refuses to be a victim 
of Russell–Stout.  
James, though, introduces the example of the automatic sweetheart so that he 
can explain why he wants to retract some of his remarks, in Pragmatism, 
concerning ‘God exists’. James now maintains that his stance on the hypotheses 
of theism versus materialism should be ‘exactly similar’ to his stance on the 
hypotheses of a minded versus an automatic sweetheart: 
Even if matter could do every outward thing that God does, the idea 
of it would not work as satisfactorily, because the chief call for a God 
on modern men’s part is for a being who will inwardly recognize 
them and judge them sympathetically. Matter disappoints this 
craving of our ego, so God remains for most men the truer 
hypothesis, and indeed remains so for definite pragmatic reasons. 
(1909, 189n.) 
As with the sweetheart, so with God. The important point here is not the 
narrow one, that many people want to believe in God. The point is that the 
value of the theistic hypothesis requires that the content of the claim ‘God exists’ 
relates us to a genuine person who is both empathetic and sympathetic. In this 
regard, ‘other minds exist’ and ‘God exists’ are to be treated on a par. There 
must be no double-standard, concerning ‘human’ and ‘divine minds’.  
Consequently, though, James should not just have recanted the claim that 
theism and materialism mean the same. He should also have recanted the claim 
that ‘God or no God?’ means ‘promise or no promise?’ His pragmatism neither 
provides us with quick answers to theological questions, nor provides us with 
easy reformulations of those questions in apparently non-theological terms. 
6. Other minds, humans or divine  
When James attempted to explain ‘the essence of humanism’, he characterized 
it in terms of ‘our experience’ (1909, 124). Given the topic of this paper, the 
obvious question to ask is: who is James’s ‘we’? James answers: ‘I myself read 
humanism theistically and pluralistically’. That is: his ‘we’ encompasses both a 
divine mind and many human minds. 
Concerning the divine mind, James writes:  
If there be a God, he is no absolute all-experiencer, but simply the 
experiencer of widest actual conscious span. (1909, 125)  
Here we find James explicitly conceding that, if his God exists, then She must 
be treated as just one (rather special) person among many. But She is not the 
‘absolute all-experiencer’. James’s God does not experience my headache—She 
is not the self-absorbing Absolute—but only sympathises with me for having it.  
Concerning other human minds, James writes: 
Ethically the pluralistic form of [humanism] takes for me a stronger 
hold on reality than any other philosophy I know of—it being 
essentially a social philosophy, a philosophy of ‘co,’ in which 
conjunctions do the work. (1909, 125) 
For James, then, neither the content of ‘other minds exist’, nor the content of 
‘God exists’, is limited to any one person’s experience; not even God’s. 
Of course, one can ask why James treats humanism theistically and 
pluralistically. But the answer is in the text: it seems to James to provide him 
with the best way to make sense of the world of which he is a part. Otherwise 
put, James’s reasons for theism and pluralism—his reasons, indeed, for naïve 
realism about other minds—are pragmatic, in a very broad sense.  
In presenting his ‘pragmatic rebuttal’ of solipsism, Schiller attempts to make a 
similar point, at least concerning the existence of other minds. But it is no 
victory for any specific doctrine of pragmatism—and certainly not for Schiller’s 
own brand of humanism—that our reasons for making certain claims are based 
upon our desire to make sense of our experiences (in the broadest sense of 
‘experiences’). The central point, which James could acknowledge, but Schiller 
could not, is this. In order for these claims to do the work I want them to—to 
satisfy my desire to understand the world of which I am a part—the content of 
those claims must reach beyond my experiences and desires, to the world 
itself.17 
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